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Company taxation is commonly accepted as a rele-
vant location factor.In this context the measurement
and the international comparison of the effective tax
burden indicates differences in the attractiveness of
locations.This study compares the effective tax bur-
den of companies based on a measure which reflects
the impact of company taxation on decisions and in
particular on location choices.The calculations were
carried out at the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) and are based on an approach
which was introduced by Devereux and Griffith
(1999).This approach is useful for analysing the im-
pact of taxation on investment decisions. Moreover,
profit-shifting strategies can also be integrated. A
more detailed study based on the same approach
covering regional differences and additional non-EU
countries has been done for the IBC International
Benchmark Club of BAK Basel Economics.1
Measuring the effective tax burden 
Regarding the impact of company taxation on loca-
tion decisions, a measure of the effective tax burden
has to reflect the decision process on investment
strategies. These so-called forward-looking ap-
proaches calculate the tax burden on a hypothetical
investment project of a company taking into account
the existing tax rules.In general,so-called backward-
looking approaches cannot measure the impact of
taxation on decisions (Sørensen 2004, 17–19). Well-
known examples for backward-looking measures are
the implicit tax rates provided by the EU Commu-
nities (2005). They are helpful in analysing distribu-
tion effects of taxation but not in the context of look-
ing at company taxation as a location factor.A com-
parison only based on statutory income tax rates is
also insufficient, because this would neglect differ-
ences in the determination of tax bases and non-in-
come taxes. Hence, in the context of taxation as a lo-
cation factor measures of an effective tax burden
should be calculated as a share of an investor’s fi-
nancial target, e.g. the project’s net present value.
The approach of Devereux and Griffith (1999) used
for calculating the effective tax burden of companies
in this study fulfils all these requirements. This neo-
classical model is based on a commonly accepted
framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984).
It provides a possibility for taking into account the
most relevant provisions of tax regimes in a system-
atic way. Using this approach, cost of capital, an ef-
fective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and an effective
average tax rate (EATR) can be computed.The cost
of capital and the EMTR are measures for the effec-
tive tax burden attributable to marginal investments,
whereas the EATR shows the effective tax burden
on profitable investments.
Marginal investments display a net present value of
zero,i.e.they yield a rate of return on the initially in-
vested capital that is just sufficient in order to com-
pete with the alternative investment. This minimum
rate of return before taxes required by an investor is
called cost of capital. Thus, in the absence of taxes,
the cost of capital equals the real market interest
rate. If taxation causes the cost of capital to fall be-
low the real market interest rate, it favours the cor-
porate investment over the alternative investment
and vice versa. In this case, taxation exerts an influ-
ence on the optimal level of investment activity.
Furthermore, the cost of capital can act as an indica-
tor for the competitiveness of a company,since it de-
termines the long-term lower limit of potential
prices at which the company can offer its products.
While the cost of capital measures the minimum rate
of return, the EMTR reflects the percentage differ-
ence between the cost of capital, denoted by p ˜ and
the post-tax real rate of return, denoted by s:
The EMTR determines the share of the return on a
marginal investment which is cut by taxation. If we
focus only on taxation at the corporate level, the re-
al post-tax rate of return  equals the real market in-
terest rate r. In this case, the EMTR and cost of cap-
ital contain the same information.2 Determining the
effective tax burden on marginal investments in
terms of EMTR facilitates the comparison with oth-
er concepts of tax rates like EATR or the statutory
profit tax rate.
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The EATR reflects the percentage reduction of the
net present value of a profitable, inframarginal in-
vestment that is caused by taxation.An inframargin-
al, profitable investment yields a rate of return p
above the cost of capital p ˜. Detailed technical de-
scriptions of effective tax rates are provided by
Devereux and Griffith (1999) or Schreiber, Spengel
and Lammersen (2002). When choosing between
two or more mutually exclusive profitable invest-
ments, a company will favour the alternative that
yields the highest post-tax net present value. Lo-
cation choices for subsidiaries of international cor-
porations represent the most relevant example for
this kind of decision. Consequently, the EATR is an
important indicator for the attractiveness of a loca-
tion,whereas the cost of capital indicates the optimal
size of an investment.
The following equation describes a particular rela-
tionship between the cost of capital, the EMTR and
the EATR:
This relationship illustrates the properties of the
EATR and helps to identify the impact of the differ-
ent tax drivers on the effective tax burden. The
EATR equals the weighted average of the EMTR
and the combined effective statutory corporate in-
come tax rate, denoted by τ. The weights are deter-
mined by the propor-
tion of the pre-tax re-
turn p that is covered
by the cost of capital p ˜
(for the EMTR) and
the fraction that is
above the cost of cap-
ital (for the combined
tax rate). Consequent-
ly, the EATR equals
the EMTR if the as-
sumed rate of return of
an additional invest-
ment equals the cost of
capital. The effective
tax rate of an invest-
ment does not only de-
pend on the statutory
corporate income tax
rate, but is also affect-
ed by the definition of
the tax base – especial-
ly by tax depreciation
allowances – and by non-income taxes.However,the
more the rate of return exceeds the cost of capital
the more the EATR converges against the combined
effective statutory corporate income tax rate τ.
Therefore, if the level of profitability is increased,
the treatment of expenses for tax purposes will be-
come less relevant for the determination of the ef-
fective tax burden. Since marginal and profitable in-
vestments display the same initial cost but different
levels of return, non-income taxes cut a lower pro-
portion of the return of a more profitable investment
and become less relevant as well. In summary, the
statutory income tax rate becomes the dominant fac-
tor in determining the effective tax burden of a high-
ly profitable investment.
Assumptions of the model
The investment and financial structure of the model
is illustrated in Figure 1.The model assumes a com-
pany in the manufacturing sector with the legal form
of a corporation.This corporation invests in five dif-
ferent assets: industrial buildings, intangibles (pat-
ents) bought from third parties, machinery, financial
assets,and inventories.The types of assets are weight-
ed equally. The financing policies of the corporation
take three different sources of finance into account:
new equity capital, retained earnings and debt from
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Figure 1weighted equally.The EATR is calculated by assum-
ing a pre-tax real rate of return of about 20 percent.
Note that this study considers taxes at the corporate
level only.First,the structure presented in Figure 1 is
assumed without a controlling company.Then,we in-
clude a chain of ownership as well as an alternative
source of finance, debt borrowed by the affiliate
from external lenders.
Table 1 summarises the most important model as-
sumptions of our calculations.The model covers the
most relevant tax provisions of the national tax sys-
tems.With respect to corporate taxation,it considers
headline statutory corporate profit tax rates as well
as surcharges and some other special rates for par-
ticular types of income and expenditures. It also
takes into account the most important features of
non-income taxes,and it generally assumes a level of
corporate profits and capital at which the top-brack-
et statutory tax rates apply.With regard to the defin-
ition of the taxable base, it considers the relevant
rules with respect to depreciation and amortisation
allowances, valuation of inventories and interest de-
ductibility in case of debt financing.
International comparison of the effective tax bur-
den of companies
Basically, international differences in company taxa-
tion can influence decisions on the location of real
investment (investment-shifting) and decisions on
the location of profit declaration for tax purposes
(profit-shifting). First, we focus on tax effects on in-
vestment decisions. For this purpose, the non-tax as-
sumptions of the model are fixed at an equal level.
The most relevant case of investment decisions of
multinational groups are decisions on profitable in-
vestment projects.As described above, the EATR is
the relevant measure to calculate the tax burden of a
profitable project.The significance of the EATR as a
relevant tax indicator has been tested empirically by
Devereux and Griffith (1998), and Büttner and Ruf
(2004).Therefore, we focus on an international com-
parison of the EATR as an indicator of the attrac-
tiveness of countries in case of location decisions.
Figure 2 contains an international ranking of the
EATRs companies located in the EU member states
have to face. The set of results was calculated with
the model presented above. A chain of ownership
was not assumed.The calculations considered the tax
law as of 2005. However, the effective tax burden
varies significantly between each municipality, in
particular in France and Germany. In Spain, a re-
markable variation is also caused by a local business
tax which depends on local and additionally on sec-
toral factors. Therefore, results were calculated by
assuming an average tax level if tax levels vary due
to local taxes.3
Obviously, there are substantial differences in terms
of the EATR between European countries. In the
EU, the highest EATRs on investments can be ob-
served in Spain, Germany and France. In contrast, a
lot of countries, especially in Eastern Europe, offer
remarkably low levels of company tax rates. More-
over, small countries near the border of the Euro-
pean Union like Ireland, Cyprus, and the Baltic
states have remarkably attractive company taxation.
Nevertheless, a lot of Western European countries
display a moderate effective tax burden. Countries
like Spain,Germany,France and Italy,which levy sig-
nificant additional local taxes, display high effective
tax burdens. For example, the EATR of German
companies would be at the comparatively moderate
level of 23.8 percent if the local trade tax were not
considered.
As a result of the comparison of the EATRs and the
statutory tax rates presented in Table 2 it is obvious,
that the ranking in terms of the EATR is mainly
caused by the ranking of the statutory profit tax
rates. This is due to the fact that the higher the ex-
pected profit rate the more the statutory tax rate in-
fluences the effective tax rate. This relationship be-
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Table 1 
Summary of the most important assumptions 
Assumption with 
regard to … Value
Legal Form  Corporation 
Industry Manufacturing sector 
Assets (weight)  Industrial buildings, intangi-
bles, machinery, financial 
assets, inventories (at equal 
weights)  
Sources of finance 
(weight) 
Retained earnings (1/3), 
new equity (1/3), debt (1/3) 
True economic 
depreciation  
Declining balance method 
 Industrial buildings    3.1% 
 Intangibles 15.35% 
 Machinery  17.5% 
Real interest rate    5% 
Pre-tax real rate of 
return (for calcula-
tion of EATR) 
 20% 
Inflation rate    2% 
3 See IBC Taxation Index 2005 (www.bakbasel.com) for regional
results.CESifo DICE Report 4/2005 59
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tween effective tax rates and the statutory profit tax
rate can also be explained intuitively. If we consider
a profitable investment with the same level of ex-
penses as a marginal investment, but now accompa-
nied by a higher level of income, the additional in-
come is regularly taxed at the statutory tax rate with-
out triggering additional allowances.
For a detailed discussion of tax drivers,additional re-
sults of a marginal investment expressed by EMTRs
are presented in Table 2.The impact of the statutory
profit tax rate becomes obvious by comparing differ-
ent levels of profitability. Looking at Austria for ex-
ample,the EMTR indicates,that the definition of the
taxable income and non-income taxation are more
favourable in other regions and do not primarily ac-
count for the low EATR in Austria. The compara-
tively moderate statutory profit tax rate constitutes
the main reason for the good ranking of Austria
compared to other Western European countries with
similar or more favourable tax bases but higher stat-
utory profit tax rates (e.g. Luxembourg, Belgium).
Those European countries having the highest com-
bined statutory tax rates on profits (Spain and
Germany) also display the highest effective tax bur-
den. Despite a lower statutory profit tax rate, the
EATR for France is comparably high.This is due to
the relatively high level of non-income taxes on in-
dustrial buildings and machinery, which also ac-
counts for the highest EMTR.
Regarding the Eastern European countries, one can
see that they exhibit low statutory profit tax rates
and favourable rules concerning depreciation allow-
ances. The Hungarian EATR is, in spite of a lower
combined statutory profit tax
rate,higher than effective tax rates
in other countries. This is due to
the fact that the rules determining
the tax base are less favourable in
Hungary,and depreciation allow-
ances and interest expenses do
not reduce the base of the Hun-
garian local business tax. The
comparatively high Hungarian
EMTR indicates that the impact
of the local business tax on the ef-
fective tax burden increases if the
assumed profitability of the in-
vestment declines.The EATRs of
Latvia and Lithuania only differ
slightly from each other, since
these countries have the same
combined statutory profit tax rates. Most notably, a
variation can be found in the level of real estate taxes
and the definition of taxable income, which is also re-
flected in a stronger divergence of the EMTRs. In
Slovenia,the tax system provides favourable asset de-
preciation allowances so that the higher statutory
profit tax rate does not become relevant. Even with-
out the absence of any non-income taxes, these tax
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 Table 2 
Tax rates inpercent, 2005 
Statutory pro-
fit tax rate EMTR EATR
Austria 25.0 18.9 23.1
Belgium 34.0 20.4 29.7
Cyprus 10.0 8.8 9.7
Czech Republic 26.0 15.6 22.9
Denmark 28.0 19.1 25.2
Estonia 24.0 16.8 21.8
Finland 26.0 21.7 24.6
France 34.9 34.7 34.8
Germany 39.4 30.0 36.0
Greece 32.0 19.0 28.0
Hungary 17.7 18.6 17.9
Ireland 12.5 14.4 14.7
Italy 37.3 22.7 32.0
Latvia 15.0 12.7 14.4
Lithuania 15.0 6.9 12.8
Luxembourg 30.4 18.3 26.7
Malta 35.0 28.8 32.8
Poland 19.0 11.9 17.0
Portugal 27.5 18.4 24.7
Slovakia 19.0 10.7 16.7
Slovenia 25.0 13.2 21.6
Spain 39.9 29.2 36.1
Sweden 28.0 19.1 24.8
Netherlands 31.5 22.2 28.5
United Kingdom 30.0 26.7 28.9
  Source: ZEW.With respect to the source of finance, we found a
general pattern in the countries considered:Since in-
terest payments are completely or at least partly de-
ductible at the corporate level, debt is tax privileged
compared to the other two sources of finance.
Furthermore, the effective tax burden at the corpo-
rate level on investments financed with retained
earnings does not differ from those on investments
financed with new equity, since assessed tax systems
treat retained earnings and new equity equally at the
corporate level. The only exemption is Estonia
where retained earnings are tax exempt.Taxation of
the marginal shareholder of a company determines
the value of the firm and should be taken into ac-
count in management decisions. Nevertheless, ignor-
ing taxes at the shareholder level is an adequate
method if managers do not know the tax position of
their marginal shareholder. However, domestic
shareholder taxation does not affect corporate in-
vestment decisions of multinationals when there is
substantial international capital mobility. Therefore,
shareholder taxation is not considered in this study.4
Since it is important to calculate the effective tax
burden from the point of view of the relevant deci-
sion-level, the model can be extended by adding a
controlling company. This extended structure is
shown in Figure 1.The consideration of the tax bur-
den at the level of the controlling company displays
the relevant effective tax burden while choosing a
foreign investment location.As an example, we pre-
sent the effective tax burden in terms of the EATR
relevant for an investment project of German con-
trolled affiliates within Europe. We assumed equal
weighted sources of finance (retained earnings, new
equity,debt) which are granted by the German hold-
ing company.
A ranking of EATRs of German-
controlled affiliates is presented
in the first column of Table 3 in
the last part of this study. These
EATRs were calculated at the le-
vel of the German controlling
company.The ranking equals the
ranking of the EATRs calculated
at the affiliate-level, since Ger-
many applies a system of limited
exemption to domestic and for-
eign inter-company dividends.
The levels of tax burden are slightly higher due to
the additional German tax of five percent on inter-
company dividends received and due to the higher
German taxes burdened on inter-company interests.
Therefore, the results calculated at the affiliate-level
provide a good ranking if the controlling company’s
country exempts foreign dividends.
It is apparent that the differences in terms of the
EATR are determined mainly by different statutory
profit tax rates and that they are less determined by
differences in determining tax bases.The decrease of
the statutory tax rate can be named as a favourable
tool to reduce the EATR and to attract highly prof-
itable real investments. The impact of the statutory
tax rate is also evident on the ranking in terms of the
EMTR. Consequently, convergence of statutory tax
rates would reduce differences in effective tax bur-
den within Europe remarkably.
Time series of effective average tax rates 
The international mobility of capital has led to com-
petition between countries intent on attracting real
investments and tax bases. Figure 2 presents the cur-
rent picture of the tax competition within Europe.
We have calculated time series of the EATR of EU
countries to investigate changes in the European tax
competition over time.A permanent trend of declin-
ing effective tax rates in Western European coun-
tries is displayed by Figure 3 for the period from
1995 to 2005. Even longer time series from 1984 on
have been provided by Schreiber and Overesch
(2005). During the late 1980s and the earlier 1990s,
there were significant reductions in the effective tax
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ropean Commission (2002, 142–43) or
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rates in Europe. In particular, the Scandinavian
countries significantly lowered their effective tax
burden by introducing dual income tax systems,
which levied a lower tax burden on capital profits.
Apparently, since 1995, rate cutting activities have
continued and the Western European countries
have, in general, lowered effective tax rates.The av-
erage of the EATRs in the former 15 EU member
states has declined from 32.1 percent in 1995 down
to 27.8 percent in 2005. The highest decreases were
observed in Germany and Italy. Most of the Eu-
ropean countries have significantly decreased their
statutory tax rate.Additionally, non-income taxes at
the corporate level have been abolished. Further-
more,the new EU member states have joined the tax
competition process. Figure 4 presents EATRs of
companies located in the new EU member states
from 1995 on.The effective tax rates of the new EU
member states before joining the EU must be inter-
preted carefully, however, because they do not re-
flect the remarkable tax incentives like tax holidays
granted by these states before EU enlargement.
Therefore, the interpretation of the observed de-
creases in terms of the EATR of the new member
states must take into account the broadening of their
tax base. This was done by the abolishment of vari-
ous tax holidays and investment tax credits.
During the last two years, a lot of European coun-
tries significantly lowered their effective tax rates, in
particular by reducing their statutory tax rates. In
2004,Poland and Slovakia e.g.,lowered their statuto-
ry tax rates from 27 percent and 25 percent, respec-
tively,down to 19 percent.The process of tax rate re-
ductions was continued by the Czech Republic and
Estonia in 2005. Moreover, remarkable rate cuts
were observed in the former 15 EU member states.
In 2005 Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece
and The Netherlands cut their statutory company tax
rates.Thus, further reductions of tax rates can be ex-
pected.
Tax planning strategies
The presented indicators of the tax burden on in-
vestment projects point out the potential impact of
taxation on decisions with respect to the location of
real investments. However, in addition to the incen-
tive to shift real investments towards a tax attractive
location,a multinational company can react to inter-
national tax differences by cross-border tax planning
strategies, i.e. shifting the declaration of profits for
tax purposes. For example, a multinational corpora-
tion can shift profits between affiliates via transfer
pricing or financial strategies. The incentive to shift
profit declaration is a direct result of differences be-
tween the statutory tax rates. The first column in
Table 2 shows the considerable variation of statuto-
ry tax rates within the EU.
It is even rather difficult to quantify precisely the ef-
fects generated by profit-shifting. However, the gen-
eral effect of profit-shifting strategies on the effec-
tive tax burden can be analysed by the model ap-
plied in this study. Therefore, the model assumption
on equally weighted sources of finance is given up in
order to show effects of tax planning via finance.
Basically, debt finance is tax efficient because of the
tax shield generated by the interest deduction in tax
accounting.Tax savings caused by interest deduction
are a function of the avoided tax
rate.We present results of a Ger-
man parent corporation. Since in-
terest deductions are limited to 
50 percent for purposes of the
trade tax, the tax rate avoided is
32.9 percent in Germany. Conse-
quently, in view of the compara-
tively high German statutory tax
rate, the tax efficient strategy of a
German parent company is to
borrow debt. Hence, we calculat-
ed tax burdens in terms of the
EATR using a debt-financed Ger-
man parent company with an eq-
uity-financed affiliate in Europe
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%ment. In Table 3, the effects of such tax-efficient fi-
nancial strategies can be seen. The differences be-
tween these EATRs and those which were calculat-
ed for the mixed financing of a German controlled
affiliate show the significantly positive effect of this
kind of tax arbitrage.The multinational group gener-
ates high tax savings in the high tax country
Germany, since it has to pay comparatively low tax-
es in most of the analysed countries.This behaviour
results in a higher tax base for the involved low tax
country,while the involved high tax country is losing
tax base because of the company’s interest deduc-
tion from other taxable profits generated in that
country.
As shown above, the effective tax burden of an in-
vestment project can be reduced remarkably by us-
ing debt. In general, a multinational group decides
on assignment of debt. The last column of Table 3
presents EATRs if the project is financed by locally
borrowed external debt instead of external debt bor-
rowed by the German controlling company. Equal
non-tax constraints in each country were assumed in
order to focus on the tax effects of this financial
strategy. A comparison of the resulting effective tax
burden reveals that it is more favourable to finance
an investment via German external debt instead of
local external debt. Only in case of affiliates in
Belgium, France, Malta or Spain, local borrowing
seems to be more favourable from a tax perspective.
This result is caused by the comparatively high
German statutory tax rate, which can be avoided by
interest deductions in Germany. From the point of
view of the involved countries, there is a strong tax
incentive for multinational groups to allocate exter-
nal debt in affiliates located in high tax countries like
Germany. Correspondingly, companies situated in
high tax countries will usually have comparatively
low taxable profits and therefore low effective tax
payments.
In case of a controlling company in a low tax coun-
try,the effects on the location of the tax payments of
the multinational group are similar.The affiliates lo-
cated in high tax countries are leveraged by external
or inter-company debt. The inter-company interest
payments reduce the tax base in the high tax country
and are taxed at the lower level of the lending com-
pany. Anti-abuse provisions of national tax law, e.g.
thin-capitalization rules, are limited, since the Euro-
pean Court of Justice bans national regulations which
can be qualified as restrictions of the freedom of es-
tablishment or the movement of capital. Moreover,
the EU council directive on interest and royalties
and the parent-subsidiary directive extensively pro-
hibit withholding taxes on interest,royalties,and div-
idend payments to affiliated companies.5 Basically,
the differences in the EATRs as displayed in Figure
2 influence location decisions on real investments to
a greater extent if limitations of profit-shifting exist.
Thus, in particular, small and medium-sized enter-
prises without any foreign affiliates cannot evade the
high effective tax burden of their location. It seems
that multinational groups can decrease the effective
tax burden of their affiliates in high tax countries via
tax planning strategies.
Conclusion
The measurement of the effective tax burden on
companies in this study relies on an approach intro-
duced by Devereux and Griffith (1999) which fulfils
all requirements to analyse company taxation as a
location factor.The calculated tax burden in terms of
the EATR is the relevant measure for the interna-
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Table 3 





















Austria 26.4 15.6 18.5
Belgium 32.9 23.0 22.9
Cyprus 13.2 0.6 8.7
Czech Republic 26.2 15.5 18.0
Denmark 28.5 18.0 19.8
Estonia 25.1 8.7 20.1
Finland 27.9 17.1 19.7
France 37.9 28.1 27.6
Germany 36.0 28.4 28.4
Greece 31.2 21.1 21.6
Hungary 21.2 9.4 15.3
Ireland 18.2 6.2 12.5
Italy 35.1 25.2 25.3
Latvia 17.8 5.8 12.1
Lithuania 16.3 4.3 10.6
Luxembourg 29.9 19.7 20.7
Malta 35.9 26.2 25.7
Poland 20.4 8.8 13.8
Portugal 28.0 17.4 19.4
Slovakia 20.1 8.5 13.5
Slovenia 24.9 14.1 17.0
Spain 39.1 29.4 28.9
Sweden 28.0 17.5 19.6
Netherlands 31.7 21.6 22.3
United Kingdom 32.1 21.7 23.0
Source: ZEW.
5 See EU Directives 2003/49/EC and 2003/123/EC.CESifo DICE Report 4/2005 63
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tional comparison of tax burden on profitable in-
vestment projects which are typical for international
location decisions.The comparison of the EATRs in-
dicates remarkable differences between the EU
member states in 2005. Spain, Germany and France
can be identified as high tax countries within the
European Union, whereas Ireland, Cyprus and the
new member states in Eastern Europe can be de-
scribed as low tax areas.Time series of EATRs indi-
cate a general trend towards cutting the effective tax
rates in Europe. In 2005, this trend was continued
and six of the former 15 EU member states lowered
the tax burden of companies.
In addition to the analysis of company taxation as a
location factor, the model can show the incentive to
shift profits into low tax countries. Multinational
groups can reduce the effective tax burden via tax
planning strategies.On the contrary,small and medi-
um-sized enterprises without foreign affiliates can-
not evade the high effective tax burden of their loca-
tion. Basically, differences in the effective tax rates
calculated without considering special tax planning
strategies influence decisions on real investments to
a greater extent if constraints of profit-shifting exist.
From the point of view of each country, cutting the
statutory profit tax rate seems to be a favourable
strategy, because that strategy improves the position
in the international tax competition on both real in-
vestments and mobile taxable profits.A reduction of
statutory tax rates in high tax countries significantly
lowers differences in the EATR between European
countries. The impact of differences in the determi-
nation of tax bases seems to be less relevant for lo-
cation decisions. Furthermore, the incentive to shift
profits into another jurisdiction is directly decreased
by reducing the statutory tax rate.
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